(prologue, Part I, Part II, Conclusion)
A. The "good war" narrative: what is it?
The "good war" narrative is a popular retelling of the events that happened before, during and immediately after World War II. According to the narrative, the U.S. only became involved in World War II when it was ganged up on, after Japan bombed the American naval fleet and Germany declared war on the U.S. soon thereafter. The narrative suggests that the American people subsequently came together to smash Japan and stop the expansionist and totalitarian genocidal maniacs of Germany who could not conquer brave little Britain, but had nevertheless advanced across Europe, Africa and the Soviet Union to conquer the world. The narrative suggests that, with American aid, the Soviets repelled Germany, but not before the U.S. and Britain had liberated Africa and much of Europe, bringing Western-styled democracy to the heart of Europe. And so it was, according to the "good war" narrative.
B. Reasons for the "good war" narrative's post-war prevalence
In post-war America, the "good war" narrative became a popular sensation. To that end, it probably helped that the "good war" narrative reiterated what had already been popularized during the war vis-Ã -vis to get the public to enlist, purchase government bonds and ration; it probably also helped that, as each example shows, the goal from the start was to put together a spin on the war that could generate a massive, proactive response and become a popular sensation. But the result was also hardly a surprise, considering that spin meant a depiction of World War II as a struggle between right and
wrong, where the American side had confidently fought against the odds for what was right. And of course, as the "good war" narrative made clear, that side had won. For the Americans, few interpretations of the war could be more flattering or self-congratulatory. Demonstrating a post-war value, some Americans even confided in the whole narrative because it helped them come to terms with the bloodshed they had witnessed, and accept their role in it. This was true of peace-minded Christians in the U.S. and, with my grandfather, most certainly also the case.
But there were other reasons for the narrative's post-war resonance. For one, it had painted the other side in such a negative light that anything called out in association with the other side became taboo. Accordingly, as long as people were reminded of the "good war" narrative, linking anything that one might disapprove of to something the other side had stood for became a powerful propaganda weapon. Demonstrating this fact, large families, family values, ethnic heritage, popular referendums and national borders have all been attacked by those opposed to such ideas on the grounds that Hitler - Germany's leader in the war -was an expansionist and murderer, and had endorsed these concepts. Presented as a logical argument fallacy, the phenomenon is known as "reductio ad Hitlerum". But what it really all meant is that the central tenets of the "good war" narrative were in continuous circulation, cementing their place in the cultural understanding.
With the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerging as superpowers by the end of the war in a new struggle for world influence, the popularization of the "good war" narrative only grew stronger in post-war America. The reason is the narrative portrayed the cause and effort to stop the aggressive foreign policy of Japan and Germany in such a way that it inadvertently encouraged proactive policy to prevent the spread of communism or Soviet influence. As such, American government officials found in the "good war" narrative a useful tool (1, 2, 3, 4) to rally the American public to back intervention wherever communism or the Soviet Union came knocking at the door, and to assure that Congress would continue to approve funding and material to prevent it. In this manner, the "good war" narrative became a means to drive American policy - and justify intervention to keep foreign markets and resources open to America and closed to communist-run states like the Soviet Union.
The "good war" narrative also became a vehicle to show that America's population, united under American ideology, had defeated those who had supposedly considered themselves superior (1, 2). This depiction gave way to a theory that America - with its random, albeit predominantly European population - was actually superior, and had been because of the unifying power of American ideology. The U.S. built a cult around this image to sell both the merit of American ideals and support foreign intervention to export those ideals. Both tools could be useful to help secure America's influence overseas, all the while limiting ipso facto the chance for communist rivals to establish influence in those very same locations.
Over time, the "good war" narrative was also used (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) as the vehicle to emphasize that the triumphant American forces in Europe had been composed of more than just people of European-descended origin. Extended to suggest that America's success and supremacy was due to America's mixed composition and not regardless of it, the "good war" narrative became an important resource to promote the inclusiveness of America's model and its universal adaptability. In turn, every American citizen could find a pillar of identity in - and unite around - celebrating the war's outcome, which was good for state morale and community. This was especially true in a state like America where, through dividing lines of race and class, there was a history that could not only be exploited by communists to sow division, but could also become fertile ground for the communists to recruit those potentially left out of the celebration and praise for America. At the same time, this inclusiveness was vital to hold the whole thing together if the population as a whole was going to be called up to fight in interventionist wars for America and export American ideals. Arguably, only the perception of a struggle to the death against "totalitarian, genocidal maniac and expansionists" had prevented domestic discord when citizens of all kinds were called up to fight in the Second World War. As a final point to consider, in the post-war era, the transformation of the "good war" narrative to convey that America was such an international hodgepodge helped to sell the American model abroad, enabling the U.S. to build support overseas that could help to secure America's power and influence there, thus limiting the power and influence of communist rivals in the same locations.
Also, due to the competition with the Soviet Union for global influence and control, America's triumph via the "good war" narrative became the starting point in a celebratory dramatization about salvaging the bulk of Europe (1, 2) from the Soviets, since the Soviets had been closing in on Germany at the same time as the Americans. In this extension from the "good war" narrative, Soviet communism was portrayed as such a horror that nearly everyone would be inclined to oppose it, providing the U.S. with a tool to polarize the communists, glamorize America and unite the American population. The idea was that, by identifying itself as the antithesis to the caricatured communists, the U.S. could achieve a range of international and domestic support that nothing emphasizing American identity or religion could match. The impression of a Soviet monster on the loose simply made the world less reluctant to accept America's protection - which secured foreign markets and resources for the Americans, and kept those same markets and resources closed to the Soviets.
Furthermore, because Europe did not resist the Americans after the defeat of Hitler, the "good war" narrative could be used to suggest that America, unlike the Soviet Union, had had the support of the people who ended up under American control. This was important for two reasons. First, the idea that foreigners wished to live under American ideology added another plank to the notion of American ideological superiority, inviting all the consequences of that impression, as discussed previously. Second, the circumstances could be used to suggest that the U.S. military forces in Europe were not occupiers, but guardians to preserve the will of the people. This was important because the perception that the Americans and their influence had been welcomed in Europe led to a belief that the world was with America as a whole, which made it easier for the U.S. to raise support at home and abroad for its global intervention, and portray its critics as some unwanted fringe element that nobody wished to pay attention to.
The "good war" narrative also became a point of interest decades after the Second World War because of the narrative's commentary about the home front. Initially, 'Rosie the Riveter' had been part and parcel to that narrative, demonstrating how American women had done whatever they could, in a fully supportive and mobilized effort, for the men fighting and dying on the front to stop the totalitarian genocidal maniacs. In more recent times, though, the image of 'Rosie' was appropriated and used to suggest that women could take matters into their own hands and should thus confidently act on their agency because that is what a strong and independent woman does. The 'Rosie' imagery was also used to suggest that women can do "men things", and that the success discovered by contributing to the war effort could be found elsewhere, like pursuing education or joining the workforce permanently. Either way, the imagery was brought to life that made people think about, and the culture reflect on, the "good war" narrative.
Critically, neither the government nor businesses had a reason to stop the feminists' appropriation of this 'Rosie' image from the "good war" narrative and the image's conversion into an advertisement to go to college and start a career; if more women went on to study or chose a career, then the U.S. government had an opportunity to earn interest from more loans issued for education. At the same time, more women in the workforce theoretically meant more business productivity nationwide, which could be good for the economy. Additionally, as women entered the workforce, the labor supply grew which, to the advantage of companies, increased competition for jobs and kept wages down. All in all, few big-name players had a reason to stop the feminists from referencing 'Rosie the Riveter', thus keeping this element in the "good war" narrative alive and well in the public conscious.
Similarly, as a tool to obstruct Soviet power, secure America's international access to commerce and integrate non-communist allies under America's realm of influence, the "good war" narrative had the full blessings of corporate America. Wherever the Soviets were kept from power, major business enterprises could enjoy markets free of embargoes like the one placed on communist Cuba; wherever foreign markets came under America's protection, measures of economic protectionism tended to be scaled back - particularly in Europe, making it easier for American corporations to compete abroad and outsource manufacturing operations to maximize profit. From start to finish, U.S. corporate giants had no reason to obstruct the "good war" narrative and every reason to support it, which was another key attribute behind the narrative's post-war success.
The "good war" narrative also enjoyed popularity because of what it did not present. In particular, the narrative hid several details (1, 2, 3) that would have muddied the conclusions its promoters were reaching for. There was, for example, no mention in the narrative that U.S. corporate giants - Ford Motor Company, IBM, Chase Bank, the Union Banking Corporation and Standard Oil come to mind - had helped build up or otherwise supported the forces on the side of the totalitarian genocidal maniacs. As such, the narrative hid details that would have undermined the idea of American solidarity and muddied the public's understanding of what the war was about. The narrative also hid that Britain had gone into such extensive debt just to wage the war that American lenders, keen to see a return, may have been in on setting up a casus belli just to have America enter the conflict and help prevent a British defeat - all in contradiction with the "good war" narrative's premise that America had been thrown into World War II. The "good war" narrative also omitted stories of mass rapes and other atrocities committed by the British and Americans, details that certainly could have undermined the narrative's portrayal of World War II as a moral crusade. Instead of all this, the "good war" narrative only delivered the air-tight conclusions that its proponents endorsed and, for that very reason, was found to be quite useful, as this analysis has shown.
C. Consequences of the "good war" narrative's post-war prevalence
The prevalence of the "good war" narrative affected the rising generation in a number of ways. Above all, belief in the narrative, or a will to believe, became commonplace. Furthermore, World War II became a source of awe and intrigue for the rising generation, creating a strong market for books, television series, films, games and collectibles pertaining to the event.
World War II-themed tourism also became a thing. For example, the Normandy beachhead where the U.S. landed in France towards the end of the war - to begin a trek inward towards Germany - became a major tourist destination for Americans. There was also a site around Porte-du-Ried, in France, which attracted visitors such as my uncle, who knew of the site's connection to a famous American soldier named Audie Murphy. Murphy, an underage, orphaned grade school dropout, had initially been rejected by all branches of the U.S. military because he was too short to even falsify his age. But in or around Porte-du-Ried, Murphy was wounded, mounted a burning tank destroyer and used the tank's gun to hold off an advancing column of Germans for over an hour - by himself - despite getting shot again and running out of ammunition. I remember the story well, particularly because my uncle told it with such great passion. I have little doubt that his trip to Porte-du-Ried, like many trips to the Normandy beachhead and other sites, was a spiritual pilgrimage of sorts, born from a belief in the "good war" narrative. After all, the Murphy story affirmed everything that the "good war" narrative had, on a larger scale, argued to be true, whether it played to the theme of "America the runt overcoming the odds", "the exceptional gallantry of the American side" or something else.
Amidst all the excitement, there were also events to meet veterans and watch reenactments. At such events, you could see fighter planes and bombers from the era take to the sky as crowds of Americans cheered from below. It was arguably more patriotic than the Fourth of July - and all of these developments helped to foster the "good war" narrative's place in the minds of the rising generation, as well as conceptions of self and national identity.
With a legacy built on presence and popularity, the "good war" narrative became a persuasive element in American society with serious, long-developing consequences. Case in point: its use in regards to Korea and Vietnam. On several occasions (1, 2, 3, 4), America's leaders used the "good war" narrative to warn the public about the threat posed by communism's expansion into Korea and Vietnam and promote interventionism. These messages may have spurred the wave of voluntary military enlistment. They also may have helped assure Congressional support for American military intervention in Korea and Vietnam.
Needless to say, the efforts in Korea and Vietnam fell short of the expectations that had grown from the "good war" narrative. In addition to the high casualty rate and price tag of the conflicts (the modern-day equivalents of $341 billion and $738 billion, respectively), the involvement did not end in a magnificent U.S. military victory, or the widespread adoption of American ideals. In fact, in many ways, the outcome cut precisely against the narrative. Americans had been conditioned, through the "good war" narrative, to see their troops abroad as a goodwill force, fighting to stop expansionists and totalitarian genocidal maniacs from doing terrible things. But in Vietnam, suspicions arose that the Americans were imperialists driven by self-serving objectives. And, whereas the "good war" narrative may have led to an impression that the world would willingly adopt American ideals and uphold American-installed regimes, millions of Vietnamese gravitated to the side of the communist movement and its catch-all opposition to 'foreign influence, rule and exploitation.' Likewise, Korea's population was influenced by organic, ethnic nationalist sentiments - things which the "good war" narrative had merely regarded as a totalitarian genocidal maniac's invention to redraw borders, increase population size and convince a people to conquer the world for him. In short, the conflicts in Korean and Vietnam offered a sobering reality check about the "good war" narrative's miscalculations and America's inherently flawed understanding of the world.
But the mythology that had grown from the "good war" narrative did not collapse in the aftermath of Korea and Vietnam. Instead, America went into overtime to assume the role it had fancied for itself per the narrative, as the protector and savior of humanity against the power and influence of totalitarian expansionists. Taking a step in this direction, the U.S. began to shed all other points of identity - including those which, alongside the raw, moralist and protectionist concepts in the "good war" narrative, had been used to encourage America's World War II generation to fight (1, 2). For example, Christian lobbies were banned from making endorsements in the U.S. government; English literacy tests were outlawed as a means to determine voting rights and multi-lingual ballots became the norm; immigration laws, once used to foster the country's ethno-religious heritage, were discarded for rules that made the naturalization of people from all parts of the world an objective; America's southern border policy began to reflect the view that anyone could become an American. Thanks in part to Hollywood (ex. the hit television series I Love Lucy), Latin American men had gone from being deportable 'wetbacks' to fun, exotic men. In line with these developments, America's leader proclaimed that it was "Un-American" to oppose the new, America-the-international standard. Symbolically, whereas over 90,000 Americans had died during the wars on Southeast Asian soil in Korea and Vietnam, some 800,000 Southeast Asians were taken in by the U.S. in connection with, or immediately following, the wars. America was open to 'globalize' itself - and, in view of its foreign policy objectives and the "good war" narrative, it all made perfect sense.
America's leaders surely knew that a globally-inclusive power could best showcase the universality of America's ideas, and present the case that the country was a friend to the world and true alternative instead of communism. Likewise, one cannot miss the connection to the suggestions, in the "good war" narrative, that America was, and should be, the protector and savior of humanity - a do-gooder global superman fighting for freedom, unlike the big-state-oppressive-totalitarian. Such ideas had been projected in U.S. President Kennedy's famous 'I am a Berliner' speech, and continued to play out in American culture for decades to follow (1, 2).
In terms of foreign policy, although eager to avoid 'another Vietnam', the U.S. stuck to its interventionist agenda against communism. This played to the "good war" narrative's message on limiting the spread of totalitarian expansionist ideology. And, to that end, by the 1980s, the U.S. had engaged in numerous small-scale or guerrilla-funded operations in, among other places: Chile, Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. But the results of America's interventionism in these locations repeatedly exposed the flaws in the "good war" narrative's mythology; instead of being heralded for keeping expansionists and totalitarian genocidal maniacs at bay, the U.S. was often accused of exploiting foreign affairs in other countries to increase its own economic power.
Not all operations ended particularly well, either. The campaigns in Guatemala and Nicaragua, for example, were based on misconceptions about Soviet interference and led to waste, scandal and human rights violations that were traced back to and pinned on America. The incidents fanned the flames of growing anti-American sentiment in a way that was beginning to have a more-permanent effect on public opinion around the globe. But the worse was yet to come - and, as the Americans would soon see, there would be more at stake than just a potentially unfavorable perception.
The key turning point was American intervention in the Middle East, in places such as Afghanistan. Here, the modern-day equivalent of about $11.5 billion in arms and investments fell in the hands of a cause that, although opposed to the communists, was religious and self-separatist in nature and eventually absorbed by a violent movement for calling for a global Islamist revolution. That movement would eventually be spearheaded by al Qaeda - the terror network that, in connection with Osama bin Laden, went on to become one of the most hated and recognized names in America. From 1984 onward, the bureaus which took in funding for Afghanistan's anti-communist resistance were funneling money directly to al-Qaeda.
At the same time, the mythology that had grown from the "good war" narrative continued to self-destruct. In 1979, the American-installed leader of Iran was overthrown by Islamic clerics and American citizens were taken hostage. Contrary to the expectations that had grown from the "good war" narrative, the people of Iran celebrated the takeover and voted to ban not just foreign-styled, pro-Soviet political parties, but pro-American political parties as well. Nothing in the "good war" narrative could have prepared America for the shock - nor had the American public known of the corruption in Iran that the U.S. system had become associated with, and had become the wellspring for growing anti-American sentiment. The narrative about the mutually-beneficial role of the U.S. as an overlord was shattered. The role of American military intervention also came into question. For instance, despite the expectation that the new government in Iran would quickly collapse under pressures from the communist sphere of influence, the new government stood firm and its people behind it. Additionally, when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Iran held back the invasion force on its own. No American intervention was necessary. In fact, when U.S. intervention finally began, it was not to push back an invasion a la the "good war" narrative. Instead, the U.S. feared that Iran, with its larger population and production capacity, had the complete upper hand if the conflict dragged on, and would eventually overwhelm Iraq, unleashing the floodgates for Iran's revolution and influence to spill into Iraq. And so, the U.S. began to reinforce the Iraqi military - the initial, expansionist aggressor.
Interestingly, the U.S. had tried to frame its intervention in the context of the "lessons" of the "good war" narrative, citing the need for preemptive action to stop expansionism. But implemented against Iran while arming Iraq, the policy ended in disaster. To begin, the Iraqi forces used America's support and weaponry to gas civilians who had rallied against Iraq's leader. Records indicate that the American government was informed of this development, but continued to arm and support Iraq anyway. The U.S. government also refused to suspend funding for the production of chemical weapons in the U.S. (HR 4185), or to condemn Iraq's use of these weapons. None of this helped to improve America's falling world reputation. Worse, arming Iraq so its military could stay toe-to-toe helped Iraq acquire the modern-day equivalent of nearly $67 billion in debt - mainly owed to Kuwait - and by default dragged the conflict out until Iran simply gave up, which gave Kuwait time to seize Iraq's oil market, both legally and perhaps illegally. Worse still, the circumstances enabled - and conceivably, as a counterweight, required - Iraq to maintain an enormous fighting force until Iran did finally abandon its counteroffensive and offer a cease-fire. With all of this in mind, it was not much of a surprise that, just two years later, in 1990, Iraq used the same, bloated military to invade Kuwait over oil markets and war debt. There could not have been a more predictable turn of events - especially once the Americans had meddled in the situation just enough to falsely convince Iraq that the U.S. would not intervene over deteriorating relations between Iraq and Kuwait.
Without the American public understanding any of the above, of course, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the perfect opportunity to fire up the "good war" narrative and gain the American public's support for the war. Apart from reassuring the citizenry that Iraq would not be 'another Vietnam' (1,2), the American media seemed to hone in on precisely recreating the "good war" narrative; to make a point about fighting expansionists, the media began pushing a made-up a story about the Iraqi army mobilizing along the border with Saudi Arabia. In an effort to sell the totalitarian genocidal maniac idea, another tale was invented to show Iraq disposing of "incubator babies." It is said that the latter was a key element that purportedly swayed Americans to support military action against Iraq.
Fortunately for the Americans deployed against Iraq, the ensuing war was the closest thing to the "good war" narrative since the "good war" narrative itself. The Iraqi military was quickly crushed and forced to retreat from Kuwait and, in the aftermath, Iraq's leader agreed to dismantle his chemical weapons. Meanwhile, communism had begun to collapse across Europe, and the Soviet Union was heading towards reform. Emboldened by these developments, America's leader spoke confidently about a new world order (1, 2) where America and its model stood supreme.
After the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, some boldly proclaimed an "end to history" and predicted that no conflict would ever exist guided by rival social, political and economic ideas. A similar theory (1, 2) emerged, postulating that the world had become "uni-polar". Whatever the case, the U.S. was in an uncontested position for the time being to lead the world forward and "protect" it from other ideologies and systems - which conveniently stretched American influence, and access, worldwide.
The U.S. began an unprecedented push to build the world around itself and build itself around the world. Accordingly, the new generation was raised not just to tolerate other cultures, but to embrace their presence with passion and hate those who opposed it. 'Multiculturalism' became the buzzword - the mode - and was presented as something rewarding to strive for. Once again, the "good war" narrative became a weapon. Films were made about the heroics of non-whites, like the Tuskegee Airmen. World War II was presented as an event where non-white American protagonists had to overcome slur-spewing, racist whites who did not understand "what America was about". Another angle was to drag out the same familiar fight against "German expansionist and totalitarian genocidal maniacs of World War II" but cast them against a multicultural America, meaning anyone who opposed multiculturalism would suddenly feel that they would have fought on the wrong side of America's "good war", which they had grown up idolizing, and the wrong side of morality and history.
The use of the "good war" narrative in pro-multicultural propaganda was amplified by the fact that there had not yet been any consequences to America's push for multiculturalism, especially in terms immigration, to put pressure on the social system or change the country demographically. Thus, the debate over multiculturalism focused on abstract ideas and feelings. Similar to the "good war" narrative's metamorphosis, multiculturalism was presented as something of moral value that was about inclusion, the 'true meaning' of America - or even just shown to be the fun and colorful choice. Around this time, the 'let us hold hands together and celebrate our differences' imagery began to take off in earnest. I still remember the cover of my yearbook from 1991, which had people of all colors - literally, crayon color silhouettes - holding hands around planet Earth. School curriculum was affected, too. Classroom art projects were tailored to introduce students to the art styles of different cultures. In addition, each week, we learned about a different, extremely foreign country. Most people probably did not learn about Oman before they were ten years old, but I did - even if that only meant engaging in an assignment where we had to draw a person from Oman (today, a politically-incorrect nightmare). I also remember the juvenile joke that arose, where one would ask the teacher what we were learning about and, when the teacher answered, the students would say "oh mannn!" and laugh. Today, a student would probably be sent to the principal and subject to cultural sensitivity training for such a remark, or maybe even expelled. That was not the case in the early 1990s.
In 1993, the Super Bowl halftime show featured people from all around the world holding hands and singing, with each person dressed to express their national identity. Today, this would likely cause an uproar; after all, if open-borders dogma dictates that a migrant to Sweden becomes a "Swede", then to suggest that a "Swede" dresses and looks like a non-migrant is arguably old fashioned, discriminatory and racist. But, in 1993, nobody seemed to foresee these complications - just like nobody seemed to foresee that the stereotypical and unique cultures on display, put forth to encourage support for open-borders global diversity, would be the first to go as a result of open-borders global diversity. It seemed everyone was instead drunk on celebrating progress towards the manifest destiny of the "good war" narrative, and the triumph of global democracy through America's unchallenged supremacy.
Of course, like the "good war" narrative itself, the 'forward march' of global democracy under the leadership of the U.S. would not have been possible without the blessing of corporate America. But corporate America had much to gain; the more interlinked and integrated the world became, the less market differences, border tariffs and other issues there were in the way of America's major business leaders making money. Consequently, America's major business leaders embraced the one-worldist excitement. In fact, they became key promoters of it, as evidenced by the fact that one of the first major changes - "diversity in the workplace as a strength" - was their doing. More importantly, it was their donors and lobbyists who pressured America's establishment parties (the Republicans and Democrats) to work towards a major open-borders commerce deal. Although there were dissidents, they were quickly squeezed out of the spotlight thanks to corporate media. The supporters, meanwhile, used all of the right buzzwords to get people on board, including describing the deal as something for "mutual well-being", "a more hopeful era" and "united economic cooperation".
The plan, once finalized, became known as the North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It pulled Mexico, the U.S. and Canada together in a way that enabled America's corporate giants to pack their bags for Mexico, avoid franchise taxes and utilitze cheaper labor there and sell their goods back across the border without any penalty. The major corporations that remained in the U.S. had something to gain from the agreement as well, as the deal eliminated taxes on goods sold to Mexico, thereby removing a barrier that had protected Mexican business from U.S. competition. By removing regional protectionisms, the agreement put many home-grown Mexico-based businesses in a position where they could not compete with imported U.S. giants, which triggered mass bankruptcies in Mexico and a surge of unemployed Mexicans migrating to America, saturating the U.S. market with cheap labor. The movement of peoples was so magnanimous that, to blunt its force, the one-worldists considered bailing out Mexico's homegrown industry with a relief package of no less than $60 billion.
Granted, $60 billion was an impressive giveaway. But in this era of corporate boom and wealth, America was living out the legacy born from the "good war" narrative and throwing its money at many problems across the globe, including world hunger, natural disaster relief, disease prevention, disease relief, and so on. Over the next decade, the 'open your wallet for Africa' commercials and causes took off. At one point, the U.S. government alone was spending $30 billion just to fight AIDS there. And why not? America was the wealthiest country by far and humanitarianism attracted votes from the moralists who supported America's global role and wanted to heal the world, which corporate America and Wall Street believed could open up new markets for investment. It was a win-win for all sides.
But cracks were forming in the foundation of the one-worldist dream, beginning with the area of trade. With NAFTA and other trade deals, the goal had been to build a global marketplace that would lower production costs, keep prices low for American consumers, generate more revenue for corporations and increase national wealth. But by enabling mega-corporations to take advantage of cheap labor abroad, NAFTA and similar trade deals sparked a mass exodus of manufacturing jobs from the U.S., driving a wedge in the U.S. jobs market. In turn, the rush to white-collar careers has turned the bachelor's degree into the new high school diploma, and created a bottleneck in six-figure professions that has driven down wages and opportunities in those fields, forcing graduates to take jobs they could have gotten with much less investment. Moreover, with powerful corporations pumping their wealth and investment into foreign countries, those countries have benefited greatly and, eventually, at our expense. This has been the case with China in particular.
Bolstered by American corporate investment, China has become a major area of concern. Part of America's confidence in 1991 rested on the presumption that no country would take the Soviet Union's place to compete against American interests on a global scale. Since that time, however, China has become the factory of the world, leading to investment in China that has grown the Chinese economy and funneled wealth back to the Chinese government. China has also used that wealth to invest in state-of-the-art, next-era infrastructure, while America's cities and transportation systems remain in the dark ages. Increasingly, China has also used its wealth to grow its military and expand its power and influence against American interests; Dr. Peter Navarro has written extensively about China's growing threat to U.S. global hegemony in this respect (1,2,3); perhaps the most important figure is that China bought off $1.2 trillion of the U.S. debt, extending its power over the American currency and aiding its bid for the Chinese currency, the yuan, to become the new, more stable and widely-traded global standard.
Other miscalculations have fractured America's global democracy dream as well. Part of America's confidence in 1991 rested on the presumption that Iraq's leader would destroy his country's chemical weapons as agreed, and America could keep potential rogue states at bay. But, as the years passed, Iraq's cooperation became suspect, and the rogues that the Americans had been supplying to fight communist expansion turned their attention towards America and its globalization projects. In 1993, a global terror cell linked to the Islamist revolution in Afghanistan bombed the World Trade Center. Thanks to America's open-armed immigration policies and open border commitments, the culprits had had little trouble entering the country, blending in or hiding their actions. It was a conceivable blow to America's prevailing ideology on multiple levels. But the country was years from coming to understand this.
In 1998, terrorists linked to Afghanistan's Osama bin Laden bombed two American embassies. Then came the events of September 11, 2001, which brought down the World Trade Center and destroyed part of the Pentagon, killing thousands of Americans and causing over $13 billion in structural damage. In response, the U.S. announced a global "war on terror", and all of the rationale from the "good war", as well as the constant references to it, gained new life. American troops quickly stormed Afghanistan, took down al Qaeda and installed a new government. But the operation soon deteriorated into a deadly hide-and-seek game of terrorism led by Afghani rebels who did not want American-styled government, culture and social ideology and saw the U.S. as a ruthless imperializer. The "good war" suddenly was over, and all signs of danger pointed to 'another Vietnam'. Meanwhile, the U.S. accused Iraq of developing atomic weapons, being an accomplice in the 2001 attacks and failing to dismantle its chemical weapons as promised. It was the perfect setup for another round of "good war" propaganda and, under this pretext (1, 2, 3), the U.S. launched a full-scale invasion of Iraq. As the following shows, the "good war" narrative ended there.
First of all, although the American forces quickly captured Iraq's leader and took down the Iraqi government, the situation in Iraq quickly deteriorated into yet another ongoing hide-and-seek engagement between rebels and the American forces. At last count, the U.S. has spent over $4.79 trillion in Iraq and Afghanistan. The "war on terror" has become a giant albatross, consuming lives, wealth and resources while slowly whittling away at American power - and there appears to be no way out.
Second of all, the U.S. failed to uncover the chemical weapons which it had accused Iraq of stockpiling, nor was there any evidence uncovered to show Iraq's involvement in the 2001 attacks. In the eyes of the international community and Americans alike, this blew apart the already-suspicious "good war" synopsis, and led to widespread distrust and anger towards the U.S. government that has yet to fade. At the same time, these events led me to investigate one of the core lessons from the "good war" narrative, used to sell America's conflict with Iraq. On the way to building support for the war in Iraq, the U.S. media had suggested that the German totalitarian genocidal maniacs could not be stopped with appeasement, and neither could Iraq. But a funny thing happened: I realized that, although Germany's "invasion" of Czechoslovakia was presented as Germany crossing a line much like Iraq might have, there was a lot that was not being said. First of all, Czechoslovakia had been a phony post-war creation forced on the population in the designated region - a mishmash of German, Czech, Slovakian, Polish and Hungarian speakers - by those who did not live there and, before Germany had even acted, Slovakia had declared its independence from Czechoslovakia, and Hungary had invaded the country, too. The discrepancies between what I found and what I had been told when handed the "good war" narrative made me feel like I had been lied to. In turn, the analogy backfired; I not only dismissed the parallel regarding Iraq, but became cognizant of the use of the "good war" narrative as a tool of manipulation.
No longer under the spell, I acquired a heightened awareness of how the "good war" narrative was being used, and to what purpose and end. I realized that, wrapped in the narrative and its idealism, the U.S. population had been blinded to the dangers of open-border/pro-diversity policy, including the consequences of terrorism, effect on employers and burden on the welfare state. Moreover, the problems which stem from foreign interventionism had been ignored, creating not just the disasters in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, but potentially elsewhere as well. Today, America's military is scattered all over the world, from Saudi Arabia to South Korea to Japan, and the defense budget stands at $600 billion dollars, trending upwards, making America's military not only the strongest, but the most expensive to maintain - three times more expensive than the second most expensive military in the world, which belongs to China.
How can the U.S. afford to maintain its military position? That was another issue I came to recognize. Because, while the U.S. appears strong because of its large and powerful military presence, that military presence is financed on loan, and the U.S. government just keeps borrowing to cover for it. For that reason, the U.S. has more debt that any other nation - $20.6 trillion and counting. As that debt continues to grow and China continues to buy off the rights to that debt, China is gaining power over the American currency, and all of this is contributing to the public's perception about the instability of the American currency.
The mainstream corporate media news source U.S. News is quick to point out that "other countries face more dire situations" with its debt than the U.S. does. This is presumably because America boasts the highest rate of economic production in the world (as measured by nominal GDP), which has helped keep confidence in the U.S. dollar and U.S. economy high, attracting investors. Notably, the strong American economy was what enabled the country to take charge on the world stage in the first place. But there is something about the power of the American economy, and the assumption of American economic power, that has gone under the radar; and, this misreporting is just as important as the "good war" narrative to understand in order to see what is happening to America. This is examined in the next section (click here for Part II).
A. The "good war" narrative: what is it?
The "good war" narrative is a popular retelling of the events that happened before, during and immediately after World War II. According to the narrative, the U.S. only became involved in World War II when it was ganged up on, after Japan bombed the American naval fleet and Germany declared war on the U.S. soon thereafter. The narrative suggests that the American people subsequently came together to smash Japan and stop the expansionist and totalitarian genocidal maniacs of Germany who could not conquer brave little Britain, but had nevertheless advanced across Europe, Africa and the Soviet Union to conquer the world. The narrative suggests that, with American aid, the Soviets repelled Germany, but not before the U.S. and Britain had liberated Africa and much of Europe, bringing Western-styled democracy to the heart of Europe. And so it was, according to the "good war" narrative.
B. Reasons for the "good war" narrative's post-war prevalence
 |
| Captain America, circa 1941: marketing the "good war" narrative to kids |
But there were other reasons for the narrative's post-war resonance. For one, it had painted the other side in such a negative light that anything called out in association with the other side became taboo. Accordingly, as long as people were reminded of the "good war" narrative, linking anything that one might disapprove of to something the other side had stood for became a powerful propaganda weapon. Demonstrating this fact, large families, family values, ethnic heritage, popular referendums and national borders have all been attacked by those opposed to such ideas on the grounds that Hitler - Germany's leader in the war -was an expansionist and murderer, and had endorsed these concepts. Presented as a logical argument fallacy, the phenomenon is known as "reductio ad Hitlerum". But what it really all meant is that the central tenets of the "good war" narrative were in continuous circulation, cementing their place in the cultural understanding.
With the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerging as superpowers by the end of the war in a new struggle for world influence, the popularization of the "good war" narrative only grew stronger in post-war America. The reason is the narrative portrayed the cause and effort to stop the aggressive foreign policy of Japan and Germany in such a way that it inadvertently encouraged proactive policy to prevent the spread of communism or Soviet influence. As such, American government officials found in the "good war" narrative a useful tool (1, 2, 3, 4) to rally the American public to back intervention wherever communism or the Soviet Union came knocking at the door, and to assure that Congress would continue to approve funding and material to prevent it. In this manner, the "good war" narrative became a means to drive American policy - and justify intervention to keep foreign markets and resources open to America and closed to communist-run states like the Soviet Union.
The "good war" narrative also became a vehicle to show that America's population, united under American ideology, had defeated those who had supposedly considered themselves superior (1, 2). This depiction gave way to a theory that America - with its random, albeit predominantly European population - was actually superior, and had been because of the unifying power of American ideology. The U.S. built a cult around this image to sell both the merit of American ideals and support foreign intervention to export those ideals. Both tools could be useful to help secure America's influence overseas, all the while limiting ipso facto the chance for communist rivals to establish influence in those very same locations.
Over time, the "good war" narrative was also used (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) as the vehicle to emphasize that the triumphant American forces in Europe had been composed of more than just people of European-descended origin. Extended to suggest that America's success and supremacy was due to America's mixed composition and not regardless of it, the "good war" narrative became an important resource to promote the inclusiveness of America's model and its universal adaptability. In turn, every American citizen could find a pillar of identity in - and unite around - celebrating the war's outcome, which was good for state morale and community. This was especially true in a state like America where, through dividing lines of race and class, there was a history that could not only be exploited by communists to sow division, but could also become fertile ground for the communists to recruit those potentially left out of the celebration and praise for America. At the same time, this inclusiveness was vital to hold the whole thing together if the population as a whole was going to be called up to fight in interventionist wars for America and export American ideals. Arguably, only the perception of a struggle to the death against "totalitarian, genocidal maniac and expansionists" had prevented domestic discord when citizens of all kinds were called up to fight in the Second World War. As a final point to consider, in the post-war era, the transformation of the "good war" narrative to convey that America was such an international hodgepodge helped to sell the American model abroad, enabling the U.S. to build support overseas that could help to secure America's power and influence there, thus limiting the power and influence of communist rivals in the same locations.
Also, due to the competition with the Soviet Union for global influence and control, America's triumph via the "good war" narrative became the starting point in a celebratory dramatization about salvaging the bulk of Europe (1, 2) from the Soviets, since the Soviets had been closing in on Germany at the same time as the Americans. In this extension from the "good war" narrative, Soviet communism was portrayed as such a horror that nearly everyone would be inclined to oppose it, providing the U.S. with a tool to polarize the communists, glamorize America and unite the American population. The idea was that, by identifying itself as the antithesis to the caricatured communists, the U.S. could achieve a range of international and domestic support that nothing emphasizing American identity or religion could match. The impression of a Soviet monster on the loose simply made the world less reluctant to accept America's protection - which secured foreign markets and resources for the Americans, and kept those same markets and resources closed to the Soviets.
Furthermore, because Europe did not resist the Americans after the defeat of Hitler, the "good war" narrative could be used to suggest that America, unlike the Soviet Union, had had the support of the people who ended up under American control. This was important for two reasons. First, the idea that foreigners wished to live under American ideology added another plank to the notion of American ideological superiority, inviting all the consequences of that impression, as discussed previously. Second, the circumstances could be used to suggest that the U.S. military forces in Europe were not occupiers, but guardians to preserve the will of the people. This was important because the perception that the Americans and their influence had been welcomed in Europe led to a belief that the world was with America as a whole, which made it easier for the U.S. to raise support at home and abroad for its global intervention, and portray its critics as some unwanted fringe element that nobody wished to pay attention to.
The "good war" narrative also became a point of interest decades after the Second World War because of the narrative's commentary about the home front. Initially, 'Rosie the Riveter' had been part and parcel to that narrative, demonstrating how American women had done whatever they could, in a fully supportive and mobilized effort, for the men fighting and dying on the front to stop the totalitarian genocidal maniacs. In more recent times, though, the image of 'Rosie' was appropriated and used to suggest that women could take matters into their own hands and should thus confidently act on their agency because that is what a strong and independent woman does. The 'Rosie' imagery was also used to suggest that women can do "men things", and that the success discovered by contributing to the war effort could be found elsewhere, like pursuing education or joining the workforce permanently. Either way, the imagery was brought to life that made people think about, and the culture reflect on, the "good war" narrative. |
| "'Rosie the Riveter' meets 2016: women helped win the "good war", why can't they be the U.S. president? |
The "good war" narrative also enjoyed popularity because of what it did not present. In particular, the narrative hid several details (1, 2, 3) that would have muddied the conclusions its promoters were reaching for. There was, for example, no mention in the narrative that U.S. corporate giants - Ford Motor Company, IBM, Chase Bank, the Union Banking Corporation and Standard Oil come to mind - had helped build up or otherwise supported the forces on the side of the totalitarian genocidal maniacs. As such, the narrative hid details that would have undermined the idea of American solidarity and muddied the public's understanding of what the war was about. The narrative also hid that Britain had gone into such extensive debt just to wage the war that American lenders, keen to see a return, may have been in on setting up a casus belli just to have America enter the conflict and help prevent a British defeat - all in contradiction with the "good war" narrative's premise that America had been thrown into World War II. The "good war" narrative also omitted stories of mass rapes and other atrocities committed by the British and Americans, details that certainly could have undermined the narrative's portrayal of World War II as a moral crusade. Instead of all this, the "good war" narrative only delivered the air-tight conclusions that its proponents endorsed and, for that very reason, was found to be quite useful, as this analysis has shown.
C. Consequences of the "good war" narrative's post-war prevalence
 |
| "Saving Private Ryan", a sendoff to the passing WWII generation, remained close to the "good war" theme |
World War II-themed tourism also became a thing. For example, the Normandy beachhead where the U.S. landed in France towards the end of the war - to begin a trek inward towards Germany - became a major tourist destination for Americans. There was also a site around Porte-du-Ried, in France, which attracted visitors such as my uncle, who knew of the site's connection to a famous American soldier named Audie Murphy. Murphy, an underage, orphaned grade school dropout, had initially been rejected by all branches of the U.S. military because he was too short to even falsify his age. But in or around Porte-du-Ried, Murphy was wounded, mounted a burning tank destroyer and used the tank's gun to hold off an advancing column of Germans for over an hour - by himself - despite getting shot again and running out of ammunition. I remember the story well, particularly because my uncle told it with such great passion. I have little doubt that his trip to Porte-du-Ried, like many trips to the Normandy beachhead and other sites, was a spiritual pilgrimage of sorts, born from a belief in the "good war" narrative. After all, the Murphy story affirmed everything that the "good war" narrative had, on a larger scale, argued to be true, whether it played to the theme of "America the runt overcoming the odds", "the exceptional gallantry of the American side" or something else.
Amidst all the excitement, there were also events to meet veterans and watch reenactments. At such events, you could see fighter planes and bombers from the era take to the sky as crowds of Americans cheered from below. It was arguably more patriotic than the Fourth of July - and all of these developments helped to foster the "good war" narrative's place in the minds of the rising generation, as well as conceptions of self and national identity.
 |
| Young American males voluntarily enlisting in 1946. Did the "good war" narrative play a role in their enthusiasm? |
Needless to say, the efforts in Korea and Vietnam fell short of the expectations that had grown from the "good war" narrative. In addition to the high casualty rate and price tag of the conflicts (the modern-day equivalents of $341 billion and $738 billion, respectively), the involvement did not end in a magnificent U.S. military victory, or the widespread adoption of American ideals. In fact, in many ways, the outcome cut precisely against the narrative. Americans had been conditioned, through the "good war" narrative, to see their troops abroad as a goodwill force, fighting to stop expansionists and totalitarian genocidal maniacs from doing terrible things. But in Vietnam, suspicions arose that the Americans were imperialists driven by self-serving objectives. And, whereas the "good war" narrative may have led to an impression that the world would willingly adopt American ideals and uphold American-installed regimes, millions of Vietnamese gravitated to the side of the communist movement and its catch-all opposition to 'foreign influence, rule and exploitation.' Likewise, Korea's population was influenced by organic, ethnic nationalist sentiments - things which the "good war" narrative had merely regarded as a totalitarian genocidal maniac's invention to redraw borders, increase population size and convince a people to conquer the world for him. In short, the conflicts in Korean and Vietnam offered a sobering reality check about the "good war" narrative's miscalculations and America's inherently flawed understanding of the world.
But the mythology that had grown from the "good war" narrative did not collapse in the aftermath of Korea and Vietnam. Instead, America went into overtime to assume the role it had fancied for itself per the narrative, as the protector and savior of humanity against the power and influence of totalitarian expansionists. Taking a step in this direction, the U.S. began to shed all other points of identity - including those which, alongside the raw, moralist and protectionist concepts in the "good war" narrative, had been used to encourage America's World War II generation to fight (1, 2). For example, Christian lobbies were banned from making endorsements in the U.S. government; English literacy tests were outlawed as a means to determine voting rights and multi-lingual ballots became the norm; immigration laws, once used to foster the country's ethno-religious heritage, were discarded for rules that made the naturalization of people from all parts of the world an objective; America's southern border policy began to reflect the view that anyone could become an American. Thanks in part to Hollywood (ex. the hit television series I Love Lucy), Latin American men had gone from being deportable 'wetbacks' to fun, exotic men. In line with these developments, America's leader proclaimed that it was "Un-American" to oppose the new, America-the-international standard. Symbolically, whereas over 90,000 Americans had died during the wars on Southeast Asian soil in Korea and Vietnam, some 800,000 Southeast Asians were taken in by the U.S. in connection with, or immediately following, the wars. America was open to 'globalize' itself - and, in view of its foreign policy objectives and the "good war" narrative, it all made perfect sense.
America's leaders surely knew that a globally-inclusive power could best showcase the universality of America's ideas, and present the case that the country was a friend to the world and true alternative instead of communism. Likewise, one cannot miss the connection to the suggestions, in the "good war" narrative, that America was, and should be, the protector and savior of humanity - a do-gooder global superman fighting for freedom, unlike the big-state-oppressive-totalitarian. Such ideas had been projected in U.S. President Kennedy's famous 'I am a Berliner' speech, and continued to play out in American culture for decades to follow (1, 2).
In terms of foreign policy, although eager to avoid 'another Vietnam', the U.S. stuck to its interventionist agenda against communism. This played to the "good war" narrative's message on limiting the spread of totalitarian expansionist ideology. And, to that end, by the 1980s, the U.S. had engaged in numerous small-scale or guerrilla-funded operations in, among other places: Chile, Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. But the results of America's interventionism in these locations repeatedly exposed the flaws in the "good war" narrative's mythology; instead of being heralded for keeping expansionists and totalitarian genocidal maniacs at bay, the U.S. was often accused of exploiting foreign affairs in other countries to increase its own economic power.
Not all operations ended particularly well, either. The campaigns in Guatemala and Nicaragua, for example, were based on misconceptions about Soviet interference and led to waste, scandal and human rights violations that were traced back to and pinned on America. The incidents fanned the flames of growing anti-American sentiment in a way that was beginning to have a more-permanent effect on public opinion around the globe. But the worse was yet to come - and, as the Americans would soon see, there would be more at stake than just a potentially unfavorable perception.
The key turning point was American intervention in the Middle East, in places such as Afghanistan. Here, the modern-day equivalent of about $11.5 billion in arms and investments fell in the hands of a cause that, although opposed to the communists, was religious and self-separatist in nature and eventually absorbed by a violent movement for calling for a global Islamist revolution. That movement would eventually be spearheaded by al Qaeda - the terror network that, in connection with Osama bin Laden, went on to become one of the most hated and recognized names in America. From 1984 onward, the bureaus which took in funding for Afghanistan's anti-communist resistance were funneling money directly to al-Qaeda.
At the same time, the mythology that had grown from the "good war" narrative continued to self-destruct. In 1979, the American-installed leader of Iran was overthrown by Islamic clerics and American citizens were taken hostage. Contrary to the expectations that had grown from the "good war" narrative, the people of Iran celebrated the takeover and voted to ban not just foreign-styled, pro-Soviet political parties, but pro-American political parties as well. Nothing in the "good war" narrative could have prepared America for the shock - nor had the American public known of the corruption in Iran that the U.S. system had become associated with, and had become the wellspring for growing anti-American sentiment. The narrative about the mutually-beneficial role of the U.S. as an overlord was shattered. The role of American military intervention also came into question. For instance, despite the expectation that the new government in Iran would quickly collapse under pressures from the communist sphere of influence, the new government stood firm and its people behind it. Additionally, when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Iran held back the invasion force on its own. No American intervention was necessary. In fact, when U.S. intervention finally began, it was not to push back an invasion a la the "good war" narrative. Instead, the U.S. feared that Iran, with its larger population and production capacity, had the complete upper hand if the conflict dragged on, and would eventually overwhelm Iraq, unleashing the floodgates for Iran's revolution and influence to spill into Iraq. And so, the U.S. began to reinforce the Iraqi military - the initial, expansionist aggressor.
Interestingly, the U.S. had tried to frame its intervention in the context of the "lessons" of the "good war" narrative, citing the need for preemptive action to stop expansionism. But implemented against Iran while arming Iraq, the policy ended in disaster. To begin, the Iraqi forces used America's support and weaponry to gas civilians who had rallied against Iraq's leader. Records indicate that the American government was informed of this development, but continued to arm and support Iraq anyway. The U.S. government also refused to suspend funding for the production of chemical weapons in the U.S. (HR 4185), or to condemn Iraq's use of these weapons. None of this helped to improve America's falling world reputation. Worse, arming Iraq so its military could stay toe-to-toe helped Iraq acquire the modern-day equivalent of nearly $67 billion in debt - mainly owed to Kuwait - and by default dragged the conflict out until Iran simply gave up, which gave Kuwait time to seize Iraq's oil market, both legally and perhaps illegally. Worse still, the circumstances enabled - and conceivably, as a counterweight, required - Iraq to maintain an enormous fighting force until Iran did finally abandon its counteroffensive and offer a cease-fire. With all of this in mind, it was not much of a surprise that, just two years later, in 1990, Iraq used the same, bloated military to invade Kuwait over oil markets and war debt. There could not have been a more predictable turn of events - especially once the Americans had meddled in the situation just enough to falsely convince Iraq that the U.S. would not intervene over deteriorating relations between Iraq and Kuwait.
Without the American public understanding any of the above, of course, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the perfect opportunity to fire up the "good war" narrative and gain the American public's support for the war. Apart from reassuring the citizenry that Iraq would not be 'another Vietnam' (1,2), the American media seemed to hone in on precisely recreating the "good war" narrative; to make a point about fighting expansionists, the media began pushing a made-up a story about the Iraqi army mobilizing along the border with Saudi Arabia. In an effort to sell the totalitarian genocidal maniac idea, another tale was invented to show Iraq disposing of "incubator babies." It is said that the latter was a key element that purportedly swayed Americans to support military action against Iraq.
Fortunately for the Americans deployed against Iraq, the ensuing war was the closest thing to the "good war" narrative since the "good war" narrative itself. The Iraqi military was quickly crushed and forced to retreat from Kuwait and, in the aftermath, Iraq's leader agreed to dismantle his chemical weapons. Meanwhile, communism had begun to collapse across Europe, and the Soviet Union was heading towards reform. Emboldened by these developments, America's leader spoke confidently about a new world order (1, 2) where America and its model stood supreme.
After the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, some boldly proclaimed an "end to history" and predicted that no conflict would ever exist guided by rival social, political and economic ideas. A similar theory (1, 2) emerged, postulating that the world had become "uni-polar". Whatever the case, the U.S. was in an uncontested position for the time being to lead the world forward and "protect" it from other ideologies and systems - which conveniently stretched American influence, and access, worldwide.
The U.S. began an unprecedented push to build the world around itself and build itself around the world. Accordingly, the new generation was raised not just to tolerate other cultures, but to embrace their presence with passion and hate those who opposed it. 'Multiculturalism' became the buzzword - the mode - and was presented as something rewarding to strive for. Once again, the "good war" narrative became a weapon. Films were made about the heroics of non-whites, like the Tuskegee Airmen. World War II was presented as an event where non-white American protagonists had to overcome slur-spewing, racist whites who did not understand "what America was about". Another angle was to drag out the same familiar fight against "German expansionist and totalitarian genocidal maniacs of World War II" but cast them against a multicultural America, meaning anyone who opposed multiculturalism would suddenly feel that they would have fought on the wrong side of America's "good war", which they had grown up idolizing, and the wrong side of morality and history.
The use of the "good war" narrative in pro-multicultural propaganda was amplified by the fact that there had not yet been any consequences to America's push for multiculturalism, especially in terms immigration, to put pressure on the social system or change the country demographically. Thus, the debate over multiculturalism focused on abstract ideas and feelings. Similar to the "good war" narrative's metamorphosis, multiculturalism was presented as something of moral value that was about inclusion, the 'true meaning' of America - or even just shown to be the fun and colorful choice. Around this time, the 'let us hold hands together and celebrate our differences' imagery began to take off in earnest. I still remember the cover of my yearbook from 1991, which had people of all colors - literally, crayon color silhouettes - holding hands around planet Earth. School curriculum was affected, too. Classroom art projects were tailored to introduce students to the art styles of different cultures. In addition, each week, we learned about a different, extremely foreign country. Most people probably did not learn about Oman before they were ten years old, but I did - even if that only meant engaging in an assignment where we had to draw a person from Oman (today, a politically-incorrect nightmare). I also remember the juvenile joke that arose, where one would ask the teacher what we were learning about and, when the teacher answered, the students would say "oh mannn!" and laugh. Today, a student would probably be sent to the principal and subject to cultural sensitivity training for such a remark, or maybe even expelled. That was not the case in the early 1990s.
In 1993, the Super Bowl halftime show featured people from all around the world holding hands and singing, with each person dressed to express their national identity. Today, this would likely cause an uproar; after all, if open-borders dogma dictates that a migrant to Sweden becomes a "Swede", then to suggest that a "Swede" dresses and looks like a non-migrant is arguably old fashioned, discriminatory and racist. But, in 1993, nobody seemed to foresee these complications - just like nobody seemed to foresee that the stereotypical and unique cultures on display, put forth to encourage support for open-borders global diversity, would be the first to go as a result of open-borders global diversity. It seemed everyone was instead drunk on celebrating progress towards the manifest destiny of the "good war" narrative, and the triumph of global democracy through America's unchallenged supremacy.
 |
| NAFTA: behind the push for 'jobs' was full-blown support for one-world globalism |
The plan, once finalized, became known as the North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It pulled Mexico, the U.S. and Canada together in a way that enabled America's corporate giants to pack their bags for Mexico, avoid franchise taxes and utilitze cheaper labor there and sell their goods back across the border without any penalty. The major corporations that remained in the U.S. had something to gain from the agreement as well, as the deal eliminated taxes on goods sold to Mexico, thereby removing a barrier that had protected Mexican business from U.S. competition. By removing regional protectionisms, the agreement put many home-grown Mexico-based businesses in a position where they could not compete with imported U.S. giants, which triggered mass bankruptcies in Mexico and a surge of unemployed Mexicans migrating to America, saturating the U.S. market with cheap labor. The movement of peoples was so magnanimous that, to blunt its force, the one-worldists considered bailing out Mexico's homegrown industry with a relief package of no less than $60 billion.
Granted, $60 billion was an impressive giveaway. But in this era of corporate boom and wealth, America was living out the legacy born from the "good war" narrative and throwing its money at many problems across the globe, including world hunger, natural disaster relief, disease prevention, disease relief, and so on. Over the next decade, the 'open your wallet for Africa' commercials and causes took off. At one point, the U.S. government alone was spending $30 billion just to fight AIDS there. And why not? America was the wealthiest country by far and humanitarianism attracted votes from the moralists who supported America's global role and wanted to heal the world, which corporate America and Wall Street believed could open up new markets for investment. It was a win-win for all sides.
But cracks were forming in the foundation of the one-worldist dream, beginning with the area of trade. With NAFTA and other trade deals, the goal had been to build a global marketplace that would lower production costs, keep prices low for American consumers, generate more revenue for corporations and increase national wealth. But by enabling mega-corporations to take advantage of cheap labor abroad, NAFTA and similar trade deals sparked a mass exodus of manufacturing jobs from the U.S., driving a wedge in the U.S. jobs market. In turn, the rush to white-collar careers has turned the bachelor's degree into the new high school diploma, and created a bottleneck in six-figure professions that has driven down wages and opportunities in those fields, forcing graduates to take jobs they could have gotten with much less investment. Moreover, with powerful corporations pumping their wealth and investment into foreign countries, those countries have benefited greatly and, eventually, at our expense. This has been the case with China in particular.
Bolstered by American corporate investment, China has become a major area of concern. Part of America's confidence in 1991 rested on the presumption that no country would take the Soviet Union's place to compete against American interests on a global scale. Since that time, however, China has become the factory of the world, leading to investment in China that has grown the Chinese economy and funneled wealth back to the Chinese government. China has also used that wealth to invest in state-of-the-art, next-era infrastructure, while America's cities and transportation systems remain in the dark ages. Increasingly, China has also used its wealth to grow its military and expand its power and influence against American interests; Dr. Peter Navarro has written extensively about China's growing threat to U.S. global hegemony in this respect (1,2,3); perhaps the most important figure is that China bought off $1.2 trillion of the U.S. debt, extending its power over the American currency and aiding its bid for the Chinese currency, the yuan, to become the new, more stable and widely-traded global standard.
Other miscalculations have fractured America's global democracy dream as well. Part of America's confidence in 1991 rested on the presumption that Iraq's leader would destroy his country's chemical weapons as agreed, and America could keep potential rogue states at bay. But, as the years passed, Iraq's cooperation became suspect, and the rogues that the Americans had been supplying to fight communist expansion turned their attention towards America and its globalization projects. In 1993, a global terror cell linked to the Islamist revolution in Afghanistan bombed the World Trade Center. Thanks to America's open-armed immigration policies and open border commitments, the culprits had had little trouble entering the country, blending in or hiding their actions. It was a conceivable blow to America's prevailing ideology on multiple levels. But the country was years from coming to understand this.
In 1998, terrorists linked to Afghanistan's Osama bin Laden bombed two American embassies. Then came the events of September 11, 2001, which brought down the World Trade Center and destroyed part of the Pentagon, killing thousands of Americans and causing over $13 billion in structural damage. In response, the U.S. announced a global "war on terror", and all of the rationale from the "good war", as well as the constant references to it, gained new life. American troops quickly stormed Afghanistan, took down al Qaeda and installed a new government. But the operation soon deteriorated into a deadly hide-and-seek game of terrorism led by Afghani rebels who did not want American-styled government, culture and social ideology and saw the U.S. as a ruthless imperializer. The "good war" suddenly was over, and all signs of danger pointed to 'another Vietnam'. Meanwhile, the U.S. accused Iraq of developing atomic weapons, being an accomplice in the 2001 attacks and failing to dismantle its chemical weapons as promised. It was the perfect setup for another round of "good war" propaganda and, under this pretext (1, 2, 3), the U.S. launched a full-scale invasion of Iraq. As the following shows, the "good war" narrative ended there.
First of all, although the American forces quickly captured Iraq's leader and took down the Iraqi government, the situation in Iraq quickly deteriorated into yet another ongoing hide-and-seek engagement between rebels and the American forces. At last count, the U.S. has spent over $4.79 trillion in Iraq and Afghanistan. The "war on terror" has become a giant albatross, consuming lives, wealth and resources while slowly whittling away at American power - and there appears to be no way out.
Second of all, the U.S. failed to uncover the chemical weapons which it had accused Iraq of stockpiling, nor was there any evidence uncovered to show Iraq's involvement in the 2001 attacks. In the eyes of the international community and Americans alike, this blew apart the already-suspicious "good war" synopsis, and led to widespread distrust and anger towards the U.S. government that has yet to fade. At the same time, these events led me to investigate one of the core lessons from the "good war" narrative, used to sell America's conflict with Iraq. On the way to building support for the war in Iraq, the U.S. media had suggested that the German totalitarian genocidal maniacs could not be stopped with appeasement, and neither could Iraq. But a funny thing happened: I realized that, although Germany's "invasion" of Czechoslovakia was presented as Germany crossing a line much like Iraq might have, there was a lot that was not being said. First of all, Czechoslovakia had been a phony post-war creation forced on the population in the designated region - a mishmash of German, Czech, Slovakian, Polish and Hungarian speakers - by those who did not live there and, before Germany had even acted, Slovakia had declared its independence from Czechoslovakia, and Hungary had invaded the country, too. The discrepancies between what I found and what I had been told when handed the "good war" narrative made me feel like I had been lied to. In turn, the analogy backfired; I not only dismissed the parallel regarding Iraq, but became cognizant of the use of the "good war" narrative as a tool of manipulation.
No longer under the spell, I acquired a heightened awareness of how the "good war" narrative was being used, and to what purpose and end. I realized that, wrapped in the narrative and its idealism, the U.S. population had been blinded to the dangers of open-border/pro-diversity policy, including the consequences of terrorism, effect on employers and burden on the welfare state. Moreover, the problems which stem from foreign interventionism had been ignored, creating not just the disasters in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, but potentially elsewhere as well. Today, America's military is scattered all over the world, from Saudi Arabia to South Korea to Japan, and the defense budget stands at $600 billion dollars, trending upwards, making America's military not only the strongest, but the most expensive to maintain - three times more expensive than the second most expensive military in the world, which belongs to China.
 |
| Yes, the country with the largest military also has the largest debt. See how the pieces fit? |
The mainstream corporate media news source U.S. News is quick to point out that "other countries face more dire situations" with its debt than the U.S. does. This is presumably because America boasts the highest rate of economic production in the world (as measured by nominal GDP), which has helped keep confidence in the U.S. dollar and U.S. economy high, attracting investors. Notably, the strong American economy was what enabled the country to take charge on the world stage in the first place. But there is something about the power of the American economy, and the assumption of American economic power, that has gone under the radar; and, this misreporting is just as important as the "good war" narrative to understand in order to see what is happening to America. This is examined in the next section (click here for Part II).
